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Yang Razali Kassim.
No. 074/2015 dated 31 March 2015
Regional States Hedge Their Bets
By James M. Dorsey
The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen designed to prevent Iranian-backed forces from gaining
power symbolises the Gulf’s new assertiveness. Potential US-Iranian agreement on resolving
the nuclear crisis has fuelled concern among Arab Gulf states about the reliability of the United
States as the region’s ultimate security guarantor.
THE CURRENT SAUDI-led intervention in Yemen designed to prevent Iranian-backed forces
from gaining power symbolises the Gulf’s new assertiveness. This is unfolding as the various
Gulf states seek to hedge their bets with different strategies that complement rather than
replace the regional US security umbrella.
Qatar this month signed a military agreement with Turkey which gives the two parties the
right to deploy soldiers in each other’s territory. Qatar is the latest Gulf state to seek alliances
as a way to enhance security in a world in which a post-nuclear agreement Iran would join
Turkey and Israel as the region’s foremost military powers. The agreement is rooted in shared
attitudes towards tumultuous developments in the Middle East that potentially threaten
long-ruling autocrats and spawned civil wars and spiralling political violence and could rewrite
the region’s nation state cartography.
Subtle and not-so-subtle strategic shifts
If invoked in a time of crisis, the likelihood is that tiny Qatar’s alignment with the second
largest standing army in NATO would mean that Turkish forces would be sent to aid the Gulf
state and recognises that Qatar’s 12,000-man military will never be capable of defending the
emirate. The agreement supplements Qatar’s soft power strategy that seeks to embed the
Gulf state in the international community through sports, arts, airline connectivity,
investment and high-powered mediation of regional disputes in a way that it could call on it
in times of emergency.
While the Qatar-Turkey agreement is between governments that are politically aligned on
one side of the Middle East and North Africa’s multiple political divides, concern among
Gulf states has also sparked subtle shifts that are bringing erstwhile opponents closer
together. Qatari and Turkish relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and
Egypt had soured since the military coup in 2013 that toppled Egyptian President
Mohammed Morsi because of the two states support for Islamist groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood and Hamas.
The subtle realignment of alliances prompted by fears that the United States will conclude
a deal with Iran that they believe fails to ensure that the Islamic republic will not become a
nuclear power was first noticeable in the willingness of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to be
more open about their political and security relations with Israel. The two Gulf states refuse
to establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish state because of its unresolved conflict
with the Palestinians but share Israel’s perception of Iran as an existential threat.
“Everything is underground, nothing is public. But our security cooperation with Egypt and
the Gulf states is unique. This is the best period of security and diplomatic relations with the
Arabs,” said General Amos Gilad, the Israeli defence ministry’s director of policy and
political-military relations, during a visit to Singapore last year. Gilad played a key role in
forging Israel’s alliance with Egyptian general-turned-president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.
In unprecedented public moves, Saudi officials reached out to Israel they had long shied
away from. Saudi officials, contrary to past practice, refrained in December from commenting
on unconfirmed news reports that quoted Saudi oil minister Ali Bin Ibrahim al-Naimi as saying
the kingdom would be willing to sell oil to Israel.
Six months earlier former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the US and UK Prince
Turki Al Faisal called on Israel to resolve the Palestinian issue as a way of facilitating enhanced
Israeli-Saudi relations. Besides opening direct flights between Riyadh and Jerusalem, “commerce,
medicine, science, art, and culture between our two peoples would develop,” Turki wrote in the
first ever op-ed submitted by a member of the Saudi elite to an Israeli newspaper.
A second indication was a decision last December by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to paper
over their differences with Qatar over the Muslim Brotherhood. The three states had nine
months earlier withdrawn their ambassadors from the Qatari capital in a failed attempt to force
Qatar to break its ties with the Brotherhood and expel Brothers from the country.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia, which views Iran as a far greater threat than the Brotherhood, has
signalled that its attitude towards the Brotherhood was changing despite its backing for Sisi’s
brutal crackdown on the group in Egypt and the kingdom’s banning of the Brothers as terrorists.
The moves are part of a Saudi effort to forge a Sunni Muslim alliance against Iran that paved the
way for this month’s visit to Riyadh by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
A recent conference in Mecca that brought together Muslim clerics to denounce terrorism was
hosted by the Muslim World League, a body established by Saudi Arabia but long associated
with the Brotherhood. Earlier, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal declared that the kingdom
has “no problem with the Muslim Brotherhood”.
Creating opportunity for China
Gulf states’ fears of Iran are likely to create further opportunity for China to strengthen its soft
military ties in the region in a balancing act that is designed to ensure that it does not challenge
US hegemony in the region. China said this month it had agreed to sell Turkey a US$3.4 billion
surface-to-air missile system that could prove difficult to integrate with its NATO allies.
China’s approach could potentially further involve temporary deployment of armed forces for
overseas military exercises as well as the deployment of military patrols, peacekeeping forces,
military trainers and consultants; also the building of overseas munitions warehouses, joint
intelligence facilities, aerospace tracking facilities, earthquake monitoring stations, technical
service, military replenishment stops, maintenance bases, and military teaching institutions.
The nibbling at the fringe of the Middle East’s security architecture is however unlikely to
improve regional security as long as it includes policies by states like Saudi Arabia that
exacerbate rather than soften sectarian divides and that seek to box in regional powers rather
than include them on equitable terms.
James M. Dorsey is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),
Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s
Institute for Fan Culture, a syndicated columnist, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle
Click HERE to read this commentary online.
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Tuesday, March 31, 2015
Monday, March 30, 2015
- Lift all restrictions on the free movement of Palestinian players, staff and officials within Palestine defined as both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as on the import of soccer equipment;
- Removal of al obstacles to the development of Palestinian soccer;
- The banning of soccer clubs belonging to Israeli settlements on the West Bank from playing in IFA competitions, a demand that goes to the core of disputes over occupied territory between Israelis and the Palestinians;
- Take firm action to combat racism in Israeli soccer, a reference to Israeli club Beitar Jerusalem, the only top Israeli club that refuses to hire Palestinian players and whose fan base is overtly racist. The IFA, the only Middle Eastern soccer association to have launched an anti-racist campaign, has repeatedly penalized Beitar, but has stopped short of cracking down on it.
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Friday, March 20, 2015
- The huge expenditure on mediation efforts;
- Qatar’s exposure to embarrassment and criticism as a result of the mixed results of its mediation efforts, its relations with controversial groups and the fall-out of its successful bid for the 2022 World Cup hosting rights;
- A belief that a large portion of Qatar’s wealth should be invested domestically in things like health care, job creation for Qataris and education;
- Unfulfilled promises of change that would give Qataris a greater say in their country’s affairs;
- A stark increase in foreign labour to complete ambitious infrastructure projects many of which are World Cup-related and have exposed Qatar for the first time to real external pressure for social change;
- More liberal catering to Western expatriates by allowing the controlled sale of alcohol and pork in violation of religious restrictions;
- Potential tacit concessions Qatar may have to make to non-Muslim soccer fans during the World Cup, including expanded areas where consumption of alcohol would be allowed, public rowdiness and dress codes largely unseen in the Gulf state, and the presence of gays.